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In a series of papers over the last ten years, Igor Zagar has been performing
an invaluable service to the international community of argumentation scholars
by reporting, explaining and defending the work of the French linguist, Oswald
Ducrot. (Ducrot’s writings have not been widely translated.) In the present
essay, Zagar espouses Ducrot’s views on the relationship between some
language particles that have an argumentative bent, and the role of context.

In this essay, “What about the context?”, Zagar aims to indicate how

the role of context is often overestimated in linguistic (and
argumentative) analysis, how utterances create their own (basic)
contexts, and how their “real,” “material,” or “factual” contexts hardly
influences the interpretation and understanding of those utterances.

By context we most often mean something extra-linguistic that is a necessary
factor in determining the intended meaning of utterances: general background,
objects within view, a common purpose, for example, can all be (parts of)
contexts. Zagar refers to this kind of context as local context. Contexts are of
the first importance for they are what allow us to disambiguate utterances.
However, Zagar quotes two sources intended to enlarge our view of contexts
beyond mere local contexts by claiming that language use and discourse
structures can create, shape or change a context. We might think of such as
conversational contexts. Zagar next introduces Ducrot’s view on context as
going a step further by finding context generators built right into language.

Certain argumentative features are already written into the languagesystem; ... on certain levels language can argue for and by itself.

In relation to context, [Ducrot’s view implies] that utterances create their
own (basic) contexts, and that these basic contexts (“basic” meaning
“sufficient for their understanding and interpretation”) can be “deduced”
... from those utterances.

(Notice that in the first excerpt the point is made in terms of language-systems,
whereas in the second it is presented as a claim about utterances.) We
cannot be sure of the breadth of Ducrot’s claim. Is it meant to hold for all
utterances or is it only some that create their own basic context? We also are
not sure what the range of the claim is across languages; is it hypothesized for
all Indo-European languages? All natural languages? Are these
argumentative features an essential part of natural languages or an accidental
aspect of them? These questions are not dealt with in this paper.

Whatever the scope of these claims is meant to be, there is no argument here
that context is unimportant in understanding the argumentative strings offered
as examples (as the opening scene of Zagar’s paper leads us to expect.) A
few pages after the quotation about basic context, Zagar speaks of an
“immediate context” as “sufficient in the sense that we don’t need additional
information about the context to be able to understand and interpret the
utterance.” It looks very much like Zagar means the same thing by basic
context and immediate context. However, even though understanding the
immediate context may mean that we do not need additional information
about the wider (local?) context, we still have to rely on the given immediate
context to understand what is being said. Either way context remains an
inseparable part of what is going on. That it is partly or wholly determined by
the use of words shows not that context is unimportant; rather, it shows that not
all dimensions of context are extra-linguistic (as Zagar has made us aware by
the excerpts he has made from other authors). Strictly speaking, then, Zagar’s
exasperation with his student, his condemnation of Malinowski, and his general
unhappiness must have to do with the local, non-linguistically determined
‘context’, not with the concept of ‘context’ simpliciter, or with linguistically
determined context.

Suppose utterances do create a context. Better: suppose some utterances
sometimes create a context. A context for what? For understanding the
utterance? But we can’t determine what context is created unless we
understand the utterance, and we can’t understand the utterance unless we
appreciate the context. Thus it appears that this approach is doomed to failure
when aimed at the solitary utterance. What is possible, however, is that some
utterances contribute to a context for the understanding of other utterances.
Hence, when the talk is about tonight’s dinner party, and someone interjects
that it is already eight o’clock, inferences are drawn and preparations ensue.
But it was the talk of the temporally approaching supper that specified a
meaning to ‘already’. Let me illustrate what I mean.

The first examples we meet in Zagar’s essay are these (I cannot deal with all
his illustrations here):

(a) It is 8 o’clock
(b) It is already 8 o’clock
(c) It is only 8 o’clock

Reviewing this quickly, I would agree with Zagar that sentence (a), although it
could be the basis of a great many inferences, does not indicate the presence
of an argument or recommend an inference at all. As for (b) it does two things:
it suggests that a conclusion should be drawn, and also that the possible
conclusions, as Zagar says, will be oriented toward lateness (e.g., Hurry up!).
Similar remarks follow from (c), except that here the conclusions would be
oriented toward earliness (e.g., Take your time!). From these example Zagar
concludes, “the argumentative orientations toward lateness and earliness
respectively must be (in a way) inherent to--written into--those two lexical units
[already and only] of the language-system.” I find this claim unwarranted.

Consider the following sentences.
(1)
You already have one
telephone
(2)
(3)
once
(4)
once

(5)

So, You don’t need another

(6)
So, You really should have
another
So, I don’t need to go back
I have already been to Germany(7)
again
I have only been to Germany
(8)
So, I must go back again
You only have one telephone

We can agree with the thesis that the sentences (1)-(4) do invite inferences,
possible the ones indicated in (5)-(8). But contrary to Zagar’s claim, these
unexceptional uses of ‘already’ and ‘only’ do not have lateness and earliness
written in to them. So, the idea that the particles ‘already’ and ‘only’ are
‘argumentative’ (invite inferences in certain contexts) might be true, but that
they always have a temporal orientation is certainly false. Either Zagar has
given us an insufficiently general analysis of the particles in question – one that
fails to show them as having the same general function in his examples, (b)
and (c), and in mine -- or the particles are ambiguous in their use with temporal
and quantity claims or some other explanation lies in wait. In any case, more
work needs to be done. In fact, one might argue that it is the different contexts
created by the different conversations in which these sentences might be

uttered that creates a context for ‘already’ and ‘only’, and these contexts, in
turn, allow us to understand how these particles are to be understood. This
conclusion is directly opposite to Zagar’s, viz., that the particles largely
determine the context.

